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A strictly risk-averse manager makes joint decisions on a firm's tax payments and book profit 
declarations according to accounting standards. It is analysed how the incentives to overpay 
or evade taxes and to inflate book profits are influenced by (1) the composition of the 
manager's remuneration, (2) the ability to control the manager's actions, (3) the costs of 
making untruthful profit declarations, and (4) the tax rate. If the firm's owner or the 
government takes into account these effects when pursuing his own objectives, the changes in 
tax payments and book profit declarations become theoretically more ambiguous. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent accounting scandals at large companies such as Enron or Worldcom revealed that false 
accounting statements have been complemented by incorrect tax declarations in order to increase 
the credibility of declarations. Such behaviour can also be found in smaller companies. The 
producer of the 2006 soccer World Cup mascot Nici, for example, had to file for bankruptcy just 
weeks before the tournament, admitting to having inflated reports on turnover on which taxes 
had also been paid. Despite this evidence of false statements for tax and accounting purposes, the 
academic  discussion  has  largely  neglected  their  relationship.  Nevertheless,  there  are  obvious 
trade-offs: a highly profitable company according to financial accounting standards like GAAP 
is less likely able to claim a small tax base than a less profitable firm. Thus, low book profits can 
help to hide tax evasion activities. But high book profits may also be attractive since they can, 
for example, have a positive impact on a manager's share-based remuneration. Hence, high tax 
payments - or even the over-reporting of tax liabilities - can help to support excessive book profit 
declarations. 
The joint choice of book and tax profit declarations in a world in which tax evasion or tax over-
payments can be optimal is investigated below. Related literature is surveyed in Section 2. The 
model, set up in Section 3, assumes a strictly risk-averse manager whose (indirect) utility is a 
function of income which, in turn, increases with net profits. If the tax rate is sufficiently low, 
the gain from excessive tax payments - as higher book profit declarations become feasible - 
surpasses the costs of more taxes due, so that tax overpayments will occur. If the fine for tax 
evasion  is  sufficiently  high,  tax  declarations  will  be  truthful  and  the  manager  can  raise  his 
personal income solely by making excessive book profit declarations. Finally, tax evasion can 
take place. Section 4 investigates the impact changes in the manager's compensation have on his 
profit declarations. The analysis, for example, indicates that in countries in which managers are 
primarily compensated with a fixed salary, the extent of false book profit declarations tends to be 
less than in countries in which the CEO's compensation is more strongly dependent on profit-
related elements. Section 5 assumes that the firm's owner or the government can anticipate the 
manager's  response  to  changes  in  the  components  of  his  remuneration  and  endogenises  the 
respective determinants of the manager's payoff. It then derives the basic features of optimal 
remuneration contracts (from the owner's perspective) and of optimal government behaviour. 
Section  5,  furthermore,  investigates  whether  the  correlation  between  two  now  endogenous 
variables is the same as predicted by the comparative static exercise to gauge the robustness of 
the  predictions  derived  in  Section  4  and  of  the  empirical  implications.  Section  6  briefly 
concludes. An appendix contains proofs.   2 
2. Literature 
Many investigations of firms' tax evasion behaviour focus on the question of whether evasion 
decisions can be separated from output choices (Yaniv 1995, Cowell 2004, Goerke and Runkel 
2006). The study by Rice (1992) is apparently the only analysis - for a given tax enforcement 
system - which considers the possibility of insufficient and excessive declarations within the 
same setting. Rice (1992) assumes that the probability of an audit declines with reported taxable 
income. If the firm's fixed costs of an audit are sufficiently large, over-reporting of income will 
occur.
1 Erickson et al. (2004) provide evidence of such tax overpayments in a sample of 27 firms 
charged with accounting fraud by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. Of 
these firms, 16 paid taxes on overstated earnings "at a mean rate of 19 cents per dollar of pretax 
earnings overstatement" (p. 5). Furthermore, around 6% of all corporations in a United States 
(TCMP) sample over-reported taxable income, while more than two-thirds underreported (Rice 
1992). 
Another relevant strand of literature focuses on the role of managers in tax evasion decisions. 
Chen and Chu (2005), for example, examine the incentives for a risk-averse manager to provide 
(unobservable) effort in a principal-agent setting if the firm's risk-neutral owner can decide to 
evade taxes but thereby introduces an income risk for the manager. Desai et al. (2007) also 
investigate  the  impact  of  tax  evasion  opportunities  on  the  divergence  of  interests  between 
managers and outside shareholders. Their basic point is that income generated by tax evasion 
activities is easier to hide from outside owners and, hence, more likely to be appropriated by 
inside managers. Using a principal-agent framework as well, in which a manager decides about 
corporate tax evasion, Crocker and Slemrod (2005) show that evasion can be deterred more 
effectively by fines imposed on the manager than on shareholders. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
presume a risk-neutral manager who can evade taxes and divert earnings to increase his personal 
income. They derive an ambiguous relationship between incentive pay and tax evasion activities, 
while the results by Hanlon et al. (2007) suggest a positive link. 
In addition, there is substantial literature on the incentives to report financial data which do not 
conform to the information used for making tax declarations.
2 Shackelford et al. (2007) provide a 
model in which a company's economic activities and book profit declarations are influenced by 
                                                 
1 Boadway and Sato (2000) look at a world with two income levels in which type I or II errors can occur in the 
assessment of taxable income. They show that an optimal enforcement system may involve rewards for honest tax 
payers, so that over-reporting of income by individuals with low incomes can represent equilibrium behaviour. 
2 See Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) for a survey. Desai (2003) finds that "the link between book and tax income 
has broken down over the last decade" (p. 171) in the United States and indicates that "the distinctive way in which 
the relationship … has deteriorated … is consistent with increased levels of tax sheltering." (p. 200). Manzon and 
Plesko (2002) and Hanlon and Shevlin (2005) contain further evidence.   3 
accounting  regulations  and  tax  laws.  However,  the  investigation  of  book-tax  reporting 
differences is rarely combined with the issue of false tax declarations. As an exception, Mills and 
Sansing  (2000)  construct  a  game-theoretical  model  in  which  the  government  maximises  tax 
revenues less audit costs, while the firm minimises the difference between tax payments and 
audit costs. In equilibrium, the audit probability rises with the book-tax difference in expenses. 
Mills and Sansing (2000) examine United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data and find 
support  for  their  prediction.  Mills  (1996)  shows  that  the  difference  between  tax  payments 
required by the IRS and actual payments rises with the divergence between accounting and tax 
data.  Hence,  the  costs  of  making  divergent  book-tax  declarations  seem  to  increase  with  the 
magnitude of differential statements.  
Finally, the relationship between incentive pay and false declarations of financial data has been 
investigated. For example, Goldman and Slezak (2006) set up principal-agent models in which 
performance-related pay provides incentives for a manager to report earnings fraudulently. The 
optimal contract includes a lower pay-for-performance sensitivity than its counterpart in a model 
without  the  opportunity  to  deceive.  Crocker  and  Slemrod  (2007)  characterise  the  optimal 
contract for a manager who has private information on the determinants of true profits and can 
inflate book profits. They also find that some reliance on book profits is optimal. 
To sum up: (1) Little attention has been paid to the joint decision about book and (incorrect) tax 
statements.    
(2) Tax evasion and tax overpayments have not been explored in this context.    
(3) Over-reporting of tax obligations occurs.    
(4) The costs of false statements seem to rise with the difference between financial accounting 
and tax declarations.   
(5) Incentive pay can strengthen the manager's motivation to report earnings fraudulently.    
(6) If there are principal-agent conflicts, some reliance of the manager's salary on book profits 




Consider a firm's single, strictly risk-averse manager who is characterised by von Neumann-
Morgenstern preferences and the (indirect) utility function u, u' > 0 > u''. The analysis initially 
assumes the manager's remuneration system to be given. His income consists of a fixed salary I 
and a variable, incentive-based component. While a fixed salary generally represents less than   4 
50% of a CEO's pay in the United States, elsewhere the share can be much higher (Murphy 
1999, p. 2495). The variable component may include bonuses or stock options. The payment of a 
bonus is often conditional on the fulfilment of a performance measure. In the present framework, 
however,  true  profits  Π  are  assumed  to  be  exogenous.  They  are  positive  and  not  perfectly 
observable to the firm's owner. Accordingly, the incentive-based part of the manager's income 
depends on true profits Π and book profits B, i.e. the (positive) level of profits (before taxes) 
announced  to  the  public  according  to  financial  accounting  standards.  This  specification  also 
concurs with the findings by Crocker  and Slemrod (2007) referred to above. The respective 
weights for true profits and book profits are α and (1 - α), 0 < α < 1. The parameter α can then be 
interpreted to reflect the opportunity of the firm's owner to control the manager's influence on his 
income. The parameter α is subsequently referred to as the measure of outside control.  
The profit-related part of remuneration declines with tax payments Tt, t being the tax rate and T 
the amount of profits declared to tax authorities. T cannot be negative and can differ from the 
true level of profits Π, which also defines tax obligations, because taxes are evaded or overpaid. 
For simplicity, tax overpayments observed by tax authorities are neither repaid nor penalised. 
Given a weight θ ≥ 0 attached to the profit component, referred to as the indicator of profit 
dependency, the manager's overall income, whether he does not evade taxes or is not found out 
doing so, will amount to ye := I + θ(αΠ + (1 – α)B – Tt). Tax evasion, characterised by T < Π, is 
detected with the (exogenous) probability 1 – p. In the case of detection, the firm has to pay a 
fine  Ftδ(Π – T),  F  >  0  for  Π  >  T.  The  fine  is a  linear  function  of  taxes  evaded  (δ  =  1)  or 
undeclared profits (δ = 0) and reduces the manager's income according to the indicator of profit 
dependency  θ.  Thus,  his  income  equals  yc := I + θ(αΠ + (1 – α)B – Tt – Ftδ(Π – T)).
3  In  the 
present setting, if executive compensation depended on pre-tax profits, instead of – at least partly 
– after-tax profits, there would be no incentives to evade taxes, while tax overpayments could 
arise.
4 
Tax authorities can be more likely to audit a firm if book profit declarations B exceed the amount 
of profits announced to tax authorities T.
5 Alternatively claiming book profits to be greater than 
taxable  profits  may  alert  the  firm's  owner  to  excessive  profit  declarations  by  the  manager. 
Accordingly, the manager's expected utility is assumed to decline with the difference between 
                                                 
3 Subsequent results are not materially affected by the assumption that a tax or penalty payment of one unit reduces 
a manager's profit-related income basis by the same amount, as long as a reduced sensitivity to tax payments goes 
hand in hand with a proportionally lower impact of profits on the manager's income.  
4 Murphy (1999, p. 2501) and Phillips (2003) report for a sample of United States firms that about 60% (32%) of 
CEOs (business-unit managers) have contracts which relate income to after-tax performance measures. 
5 Desai (2003, 2005), Hanlon and Shevlin (2005), Manzon and Plesko (2002), and Plesko (2004), inter alia, provide 
examples for opportunities to declare divergent book and tax profit levels in the United States.   5 
book profits B and tax profits T. This relationship is consistent with the evidence by Mills (1996) 
and Mills and Sansing (2000), and is assumed to apply irrespective of whether tax profits T 
exceed or fall short of true profits Π. For simplicity, a linear impact is assumed in which the 
parameter β measures the strength of this effect. Hence, expected utility declines by β(B – T) > 0 
for B – T > 0, while β = 0 holds for B – T ≤ 0. This restriction captures the idea that tax profit 
declarations which equal or exceed book profit statements will not cause any direct utility loss to 
the manager. Conformity between book and tax declarations does not usually exist and seems 
undesirable (Hanlon et al. 2005, Hanlon and Shevlin 2005). However, the decisive feature of the 
model is that any book-tax difference surpassing a threshold - here normalised to zero - is costly. 
If differential book profit and tax profit declarations are not feasible, because they result in the 
certain detection of false statements, this restriction requires B = T and β = 0. 
Excessive book profit declarations can also be costly for the manager from another perspective. 
Suppose that the manager is found out to have inflated book profits to boost his own income. 
Such an action can reduce his future reputation or impair the opportunities to act on behalf of the 
firm.  Alternatively,  claiming  excessive  profits  can  induce  the  firm's  owner  to  dismiss  the 
manager, or it can have adverse effects on the manager's future job opportunities. As will be 
argued below, the existence of positive costs of excessive book profit declarations - relative to 
true profits - will be a prerequisite for a unique, interior solution to the manager's optimisation 
exercise  if  tax  overpayments  arise.  For  such  a  setting  only,  it  is  presumed  that  book  profit 
declarations  in  excess  of  true  profits  reduce  expected  utility  according  to  a  strictly  convex, 
continuous function γ = γ(B – Π), which implies γ, γ', γ'' > (=) 0 for B – Π > (≤) 0. If there are no 
tax overpayments (Π ≥ T), the costs of excessive book profit declarations - relative to true profits 
- are not required to ensure an interior solution and γ(•) = 0 will be presumed for simplicity.  
Denoting the manager's expected utility by V, we can express his objective for B > Π > T as: 
)
c y :
)) T ( Ft Tt B ) 1 ( ( I ( u ) p 1 ( )
e y :
) Tt B ) 1 ( ( I ( pu V 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 1 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 2 1
=
- P d - - a - + P a q + - +
=
- a - + P a q + =  - β(B - T) (1) 
If B > Π and T ≥ Π, there can be no income variation owing to a penalty payment. For T > Π the 
costs  γ(B - Π)  also  need  to  be  incorporated.  In  the  absence  of  income  variations  due  to 
uncertainty, ye = yc = y holds (as F = 0 for Π ≤ T), and the manager's objective is given by: 
)
y :
) Tt B ) 1 ( ( I ( u V 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 2 1
=
- a - + P a q + =  - β(B – T) – γ(B – Π)        (1') 
   6 
3.2 Optimal Choices 
The manager declares taxable profits T to tax authorities and announces book profits B to the 
public. Optimal tax and book profit declarations B* and T* can differ and, furthermore, exceed, 
fall short of, or equal true profits Π. The ensuing multiplicity of potentially optimal statements 
can  be  reduced  by  taking  into  account  the  following  observations:  firstly,  book  profit 
declarations B which are strictly less than true and tax profits (B < Π, T) cannot be optimal since 
an increase in B would only raise income. Secondly, a situation in which tax profit statements T 
exceed both true and book profits (T > B, Π) cannot be optimal either because lowering T would 
only reduce costs. Thirdly, truthful declarations (Π = T = B) are irrelevant since we want to 
analyse the determinants of deviations. Thus, four combinations of profit levels and declarations 
remain:   
Case 1: Tax declarations are truthful while book profits exceed the true level (B* > Π = T > 0)   
Case 2: Tax profit statements are excessive but do not surpass book profits (B* ≥ T* > Π > 0)   
Case 3: Taxes are evaded while book profits exceed tax profit declarations (B*, Π > T* > 0)   
Case 4: Taxes are evaded while book profits equal tax profit statements (Π > T* = B > 0). 
Case 2 can only arise if the tax rate t is low, relative to the share of book profits 1 - α, i.e. if 1 - α 
- t > 0. To verify the restriction, suppose otherwise and presume that the manager reduces book 
and tax profits equally (dB* = dT* < 0). The costs of false profit declarations decline since B* - 
Π  >  0  shrinks,  while  B*  -  T*  is  held  constant  by  assumption.  Moreover,  the  profit-related 
component of remuneration ∆ := αΠ + (1 - α)B* - T*t > 0 changes by t - 1 + α if B* and T* 
decline by the same amount. If t - 1 + α > 0, in contrast to the above restriction, not only the 
costs of more truthful declarations decline but the gain rises as well. Thus, B ≥ T > Π cannot be 
optimal and Case 2 can only be sustained for 1 - α - t > 0. A similar argument will apply to Cases 
3 and 4 if the tax rate is too low and these two settings can, thus, only be optimal for t > 1 - α.  
Starting with a marginally positive tax rate t (t > 0, t → 0), the manager has an incentive to 
overpay taxes since this is (almost) costless. For low tax rates the manager will, hence, select 
book and tax profit declarations so as to generate an outcome according to Case 2 - assuming 
that the costs of false declarations allow for non-truthful statements. Utility V shrinks with the 
tax rate, given optimal choices of B and T, as the application of the envelope theorem to (1') 
clarifies.  If the tax rate t is greater than a  critical value t*, 0 < t* < 1 - α, the payoff  from 
excessive  tax  profit  declarations  will  become  sufficiently  small  so  that  taxes  are  no  longer 
overpaid.  Hence,  an  outcome  according  to  Case  1  becomes  optimal.  In  this  situation,  over-
reporting will be too costly because of the resulting tax payments. Moreover, tax evasion is not 
beneficial since the costs of excessive book profits fall short of the (expected) costs of under-  7 
reporting tax obligations. The manager's payoff will also decline with the tax rate t if he selects 
book profits according to Case 1. If the fine for tax evasion is not too high, the manager will start 
evading once the tax rate t exceeds a critical value t**, 1 - α < t** < 1. Given that the marginal 
costs β of excessive book profits relative to tax profits are not too high, a choice of declarations 
according  to  Case  3  maximises  the  manager's  expected  utility.  Otherwise  he  is  honest  with 
respect to B and an outcome in line with Case 4 occurs. Assuming linear relations and Case 3 to 
dominate Case 4, the manager's payoffs are depicted as functions of the tax rate t in Figure 1.
6 
 
Figure 1: Tax Rate t, Expected Utility V, and Optimal Outcomes 
 
 
Assuming an interior solution with tax evasion (T* < Π) and book profits in excess of true profits 
(B* > Π), i.e. Case 3, for which γ(•) = 0 holds, the optimal statements B* and T* are defined by: 
0 ) c y ( ' u ) p 1 ( ) e y ( ' pu ) 1 ( B V = b -  

 
 - + a - q =           (2) 
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Relative to a pure tax evasion framework, there is an additional gain from paying taxes in the 
present setting, as higher tax profits reduce the costs of excessive book profits β(B – T). The 
optimal choice(s) in the other three cases is (are) obtained by maximising V, but focussing on 
                                                 
6 If, for example, tax evasion is penalised more strongly than assumed in Figure 1, t** will be higher and the payoffs 
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one first-order condition in Cases 1 and 4, and/ or imposing F = 0 in Cases 1 and 2, and β = 0 in 
Case 4. Since the second-order conditions vary from case to case, they are dealt with below.  
 
4. Comparative Statics for Exogenous Remuneration Contract 
How are optimal book and tax profit declarations in the four possible outcomes affected by 
changes in (1) the indicator of the profit dependency of the manager's income q, (2) the measure 
of outside control α, (3) the fixed salary I, (4) the marginal costs β of making divergent book-tax 
declarations,  and  (5)  the  tax  rate  t?  Exclusively  the  consequences  for  local  maxima  are 
considered, that is, the order of optimal profit declarations is assumed to be unaffected. Since 
Case 4 strongly resembles a traditional tax evasion problem, its analysis is kept brief.  
4.1 Case 1: Truthful Tax Declarations And Excessive Book Profits 
Let the manager's profit-related income be denoted by θ (B, T),  (B, T) := αΠ + (1 – α)B - tT. 
The manager's behaviour will be governed solely by the first-order condition (2) with respect to 
the  optimal  choice  of  book  profits  B  if,  first,  the  gains  from  tax  evasion  are  negative,  for 
example, due to a sufficiently high fine F and, second, an overpayment of taxes is too costly. 
Given the above assumptions, Π = T and, hence, y = I + θ((α - t)Π + (1 – α)B) = I + θ (B) hold. 
In such a setting, we obtain: 
Proposition 1 (Case 1, B* > Π = T) 
If tax profit declarations are truthful (T = Π) and optimal book profits B* exceed true profits, B* 
increases with the tax rate t, and will also rise with the indicator of profit dependency θ if relative 
risk aversion is less than the ratio of total income y to profit-related income θ (B). Optimal book 
profits B* decline with the marginal costs β of divergent book-tax declarations and the salary I, 
and will also fall with the measure of outside control α if relative risk aversion is not too high. 
Proof: see Appendix 1 
Remarks 
(β, I, t) If the marginal costs β of excessive book profits relative to taxable profits rise, the 
manager will reduce the optimal amount of book profit declarations B* since the utility gain 
from excessive statements shrinks. An increase  in the salary  I (a decrease in the tax rate t) 
reduces the marginal utility due to the strict concavity of the utility function u. Thus, the gain 
from making excessive declarations declines and optimal book profits fall.  
(θ,  α)  On  the  one  hand,  a  greater  weight  θ  of  profits  in  the  manager's  remuneration  raises 
marginal utility, so that the incentives to make excessive book profit declarations increase. On   9 
the other hand, the manager's income rises and marginal utility of income declines. This effect 
tends to lower book profits. If (relative) risk aversion is not too great, the former impact will 
dominate the latter and optimal book profit declarations B* will rise. The greater the share is of 
the salary I in the manager's total remuneration, that is the higher the ratio of total to profit-
related income, the greater relative risk aversion can be, in order for a positive relation between θ 
and B* to exist. This is the case because the rise in income due to a greater weight θ of profits 
and the ensuing fall in marginal utility will be small if profits do not affect income by much. 
Hence, the impact of risk aversion, relative to the direct income effect, does not play a great role.  
A shift in the composition of the manager's income, so that a rise in I is compensated by a fall in 
the parameter θ, holding constant income y for a given value of B, also reduces optimal book 
profits B*. Hence, the salary effect dominates the consequences of a higher profit dependency. 
The reverse intuition as it applies for a rise in the indicator of profit dependency θ pertains to an 
increase in the measure of outside control α. A rise in α directly reduces the gain from excessive 
book profits. However, as income falls risk aversion considerations become less important.  
 
4.2 Case 2: Tax Profit Declarations Are Excessive But Do Not Surpass Book Profit Declarations 
Suppose next, that the manager optimally declares a level of taxable profits T* which exceeds 
the true level Π but falls (weakly) short of optimal book profits B*. His payoff is certain because 
only  tax  evasion  is  fined,  whereas  tax  overpayments  cannot  be  reclaimed.  However,  costs  
γ(B  –  Π)  of  excessive  book  profits  -  relative  to  true  profits  -  arise.  The  manager's  utility 
maximum is implicitly defined by: 
0 ) * (B ' *)) tT * B ) 1 ( ( I ( ' u ) 1 ( B V = P - g - b - - a - + P a q + a - q =      (2') 
0 *)) tT * B ) 1 ( ( I ( ' tu T V = b + - a - + P a q + q - =         (3') 
Inspection of equations (2') and (3') clarifies that an interior solution (B ≥ T > Π) can only be 
assured if a rise in book profits and a fall in tax profit declarations affect utility V differently. 
Positive costs γ(B - Π) of excessive book profit statements relative to true profits guarantee this 
requirement. Given a unique interior solution, which requires at least one of the cost functions β 
or γ to be strictly convex (see Appendix 2), equations (2') and (3') yield: 
Proposition 2 (Case 2, B* ≥ T* > Π) 
Assume excessive tax payments and book profit declarations that weakly surpass declared tax 
profits.  Optimal  book  profits  B*  are  unaffected  by  the  salary  I  and  the  indicator  of  profit 
dependency θ. Optimal tax profits T* increase with the salary I and change in an ambiguous   10 
manner with the profit dependency of income θ. An increase in the measure of outside control α 
and the tax rate t lower optimal book and tax profit statements, while a rise in the marginal costs 
β of making divergent book-tax profit declarations has the reverse impact for T* < B*. 
Proof: see Appendix 2 
Remarks 
(θ) An increase in the indicator θ of profit dependency has two effects: firstly, it raises the 
marginal gains u'(y)θ of higher book declarations and tax profit declarations and, thus, requires a 
larger income y. Secondly, income rises and the marginal utility decreases. The overall impact 
on tax profit declarations depends on the magnitude of relative risk aversion. It can be noted that 
any change in income y in response to the increase in θ affects the manager's choice of book and 
tax profits equally, with the exception of a constant factor. Since the marginal costs of excessive 
book profit statements are given by γ'(B - Π) and change with the difference between book and 
true profits (as γ'' > 0) and because true profits are fixed, book profits must remain the same for 
the first-order condition (2') to hold. Thus, the entire adjustment in income in response to an 
increase in θ is due to the variation in tax profits T*.  
(α) A stronger impact of true profits on the manager's income reduces his incentives to make 
excessive book profit statements since B* > Π. If book profits decline, the gain from overpaying 
taxes will also shrink. The first-order condition for the optimal choice of tax profits demonstrates 
that optimal book profits and optimal tax profits have to be adjusted in order to leave overall 
income y unaffected. Constancy of y implies dy/dα = θ[Π – B* + (1 - α)(∂B*/∂α) - t(∂T*/∂α)] = 
0. Since Π < B*, 1 - α > t, and ∂B*/∂α, ∂T*/∂α < 0 hold, tax profit declarations are reduced by 
more than book profits. Such behaviour is beneficial for the manager since the income gain more 
than compensates the higher costs of divergent book-tax declarations.  
(β) An increase in the marginal costs β of making divergent book-tax profit declarations provides 
an incentive to align book profits B* and tax profits T*. At first glance it appears as if this can 
best be achieved by reducing B* and raising T*. However, such a response would lower the 
manager's income. To mitigate the fall in income, the manager does not reduce but actually 
raises optimal book profit declarations B*. Since excessive book profits entail marginal costs 
irrespective of tax profit declarations for B* > Π, book profit declarations rise by less than tax 
profits so that initially B* > T* has to hold for the order of profit declarations to be preserved. 
(I) The first-order condition (3') for the optimal choice of tax profits T* shows that a variation in 
the salary I must be compensated by an adjustment in book profits or in tax profits so that overall 
income  y  is  unaffected.  From  the  first-order  condition  (2)  for  optimal  book  profits  B*  it  is   11 
apparent that a constant income y requires B* and the marginal costs γ'(B* – Π) of excessive 
book profit statements to be unaffected. Accordingly, tax overpayments T* have to rise. This is 
the optimal response to a higher salary I since a decline in book profit declarations by one unit 
reduces income by 1 - α units, whereas greater tax profits lower income by t < 1 – α units.  
It is noteworthy that the results relating to an increase in I also hold for a shift in the composition 
of the manager's income. In particular, a rise in I is compensated by a fall in the indicator θ of 
profit dependency so that income y remains constant, for given values of B and T. 
(t) A higher tax rate t raises the costs of excessive tax payments. Accordingly, overpayments are 
reduced. This response raises the manager's income for given book profits.
7 Thus, the marginal 
(expected) utility of income falls. To bring the gain from excessive book profit declarations into 
line with the resulting costs, book profits have to fall, but by less than tax profits.  
In the set-up outlined in Section 3, the costs of excessive book profit declarations have been 
modelled in the simplest manner feasible. In particular, a convexity assumption for γ has been 
made  to  ensure  an  interior  solution  (cf.  Appendix  2).  However,  there  are  neither  theoretical 
arguments nor empirical findings which rule out other functional forms of the cost functions. To 
evaluate the robustness of Proposition 2, alternatively a linear function  ) B ( ~ P - g ,  ' ~ g  > (=) 0, for 
B > (≤) Π,  0 ' ' ~ = g ,  and  a  strictly  convex  function  ) T B (
~




b b  > (= 0),  for  B > (≤) T,  is 
presumed.  In  such  a  specification,  the  only  unambiguous  predictions  are  dB*/d g ~ ,  dB*/dI, 
dT*/d g ~ , dT*/dI < 0. Therefore, solely the finding regarding the impact of the salary I on optimal 
book profits B* is robust enough to withstand alternative assumptions with respect to the costs of 
excessive book profit declarations.
8 The differential results arise because a linear cost function β 
implies  that  any  change  in  the  determinants  of  the  manager's  remuneration  has  to  leave  his 
overall income y unaffected, a change in the indicator of profit dependency θ being the sole 
exception (cf. equation (3')). However, if the cost function γ is linear (and given by  g ~ ), this 
restriction does not arise, so that comparative static results become more ambiguous and are 
occasionally even reversed. 
As an additional check of robustness suppose that differential profit declarations are not feasible 
because they are infinitely costly, implying B = T > Π and β = 0. The effects of variations in the 
                                                 
7 The overall effect of a higher tax rate on tax payments equals d(T*t)/dt = u'(y)(γ'' - θ2(1 - α)2u''(y))/(γ''u''(y)θt) < 0, 
which can be calculated making use of equation (A.2.8) in Appendix 2. 
8 The computations which prove the findings stated above are analogous to those presented in Appendix 2. An 
increase in the fixed salary I and a concomitant reduction in the parameter θ, which cancel each other out, so that 
income y remains constant, have the same qualitative consequences as a sole increase in I.   12 
parameters θ, α, and t depend on the magnitude of the measure of absolute risk aversion. Solely 
the impact of the salary I is unambiguous, in that a rise in I reduces optimal book profits B*.
9 
 
4.3 Case 3: Taxes Are Evaded While Book Profits Exceed Tax Profit Declarations 
Suppose next that taxes are evaded while book profits exceed tax declarations. Book profits can 
either surpass or fall short of true profits. Since the magnitude of B relative to Π has no impact 
on the results in the case of tax evasion for B > T, given the assumption of γ(•) = 0 for this set-
up, no further distinction of profit rankings is required. In contrast to Cases 1 and 2, income can 
vary according to whether tax evasion is detected or not. Thus, optimal behaviour is determined 
by  the  first-order  conditions  (2)  and  (3)  for  ye  >  yc.  Formally,  the  manager's  maximisation 
problem is, thus, similar to that of a tax evading individual who also chooses his working hours. 
Proposition 3 (Case 3, B*, Π > T*) 
Assume that taxes are evaded while book profits exceed tax profit declarations. Optimal book 
profit declarations B* decline with the salary I and will fall (rise) with the marginal costs β of 
making divergent book-tax profit declarations (the tax rate t) if VTB ≤ 0, that is, if absolute risk 
aversion  decreases  strongly  with  income.  Tax  evasion  will  fall  with  the  indicator  of  profit 
dependency θ if absolute risk aversion does not decrease with income. Moreover, tax evasion 
does not change with the salary I, and will rise with the tax rate t if the penalty is a function of 
undeclared  income  (δ  =  0).  If  VTB  <  0  holds,  higher  marginal  costs  β  of  divergent  profit 
declarations and a greater measure of outside control α will decrease tax evasion. For VTB > 0, 
tax evasion will rise with a greater measure of outside control α. 
Proof: see Appendix 3 
Remarks 
(I, θ) Tax evasion will not be affected by the fixed salary I because the complete adjustment in 
income required to neutralise the impact of a rise in I is achieved via a fall in B*. This effect 
arises since variations in book profits affect both first-order conditions (2) and (3) equally. 
A higher profit dependency θ has a substitution and an income effect. The substitution effect 
raises tax evasion, for a given amount of book profits, and increases book profits for a given 
                                                 
9 For B = T > Π and β = 0, equation (2') defines the optimal selection of B since ∂V/∂T < 0 according to (3'). Hence, 
B and T are increased to the same extent beyond Π until the gain in income just balances the additional costs 
captured by γ'(B - Π). Differentiation of (2') for B = T and 1 - α - t > 0  yields VBB, VBI < 0, while the signs of the 
other derivatives depend on the relation between the first and second derivative of the utility function u.   13 
extent of evasion. The income effect induces adjustments in opposite directions.
10 Since income 
declines, constant or increasing absolute risk aversion ensures that tax evasion falls.  
If a rise in the salary I is combined with a decline in the indicator of profit dependency θ, holding 
income constant in both states of the world, for given values of B and T, optimal tax profits will 
rise while book profits fall. Therefore, with respect to book profits the impact of a higher salary 
dominates the effect of a lower indicator of profit dependency, as it is also true for Cases 1 and 2.  
(β) Greater marginal costs β of making divergent book-tax declarations lower the gain from 
excessive book and insufficient tax profit statements. Ceteris paribus, book profit declarations 
and tax evasion decline. However, this potential decline in book profit statements and in the 
amount of taxes evaded reduces income. For the initial impact to unambiguously dominate the 
ensuing risk effect, implying that tax evasion t(Π – T*) and excessive book profit statements B* 
shrink, absolute risk aversion has to strongly decline with income.  
(α) A stronger outside control, as measured by a rise in the parameter α, reduces the manager's 
income, given that book profits exceed the true level. Moreover, the incentives for excessive 
book profit declarations decline, for a given income, as income and (expected) utility will rise by 
less with book profits if their relative weight falls. Both effects imply a reduction in income to 
which the manager will react by raising (reducing) tax evasion if absolute risk aversion does not 
decrease too much (falls strongly). The change in book profits B* is ambiguous since the fall in 
income raises the incentives to make excessive declarations, while the smaller impact of book 
profits on income reduces them. 
(t) Basically, the impact of a higher tax rate t on tax evasion will be ambiguous because of the 
counteracting impact of a higher penalty - if it depends on the amount of taxes evaded - and the 
substitution impact due to the increase in book profit statements. Therefore, tax evasion will rise 
if the penalty impact does not occur, i.e. the penalty does not depend on the tax rate and δ = 0 
holds. Moreover, for a given tax profit declaration, a higher tax rate reduces income so that 
optimal  book  profit  statements  B*  rise.
11  Apart  from  this  direct  positive  impact,  there  is  an 
indirect impact which can work in the opposite direction. This indirect effect occurs due to the 
substitution effect of a higher tax rate which drives up tax evasion and raises income. If absolute 
risk  aversion  rises  -  or  weakly  decreases  -  with  income,  the  manager  will  counteract  this 
development by decreasing income and book profits. Accordingly, the sign of dB*/dt can only 
be determined if absolute risk aversion strongly decreases with income and will then be positive. 
 
                                                 
10 See equations (A.3.4) and (A.3.7) in Appendix 3. 
11 This result can be obtained from equations (A.3.1) and (A.3.10) in Appendix 3.   14 
4.4 Case 4: Taxes Are Evaded While Book Profits Equal Tax Profit Statements 
The first-order condition for a setting in which optimal tax profits coincide with book profit 
declarations, while both fall short of true profits, is given by equation (3) for T* = B since  
β(B – T) = 0 implies VB > 0. However, book profits B are not raised beyond T* because this 
would entail marginal costs β assumed to be too high for B > T to be optimal. Hence, only an 
interior solution for tax profit declarations T* can be achieved. This framework is compatible 
with the interpretation that divergent profit declarations are not feasible because this would be 
detected  with  certainty.  Basically,  Case  4  resembles  a  pure  tax  evasion  setting.  Thus,  the 
intuition for Proposition 4 is similar to - or the same as - that in a standard tax evasion model à la 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974), and will not be dwelt upon further. 
Proposition 4 (Case 4, Π > T* = B) 
Suppose that optimal tax profit declarations T* equal book profits but fall short of true profits. 
Tax  evasion  will  rise  (fall)  with  the  salary  I  if  a  manager  exhibits  decreasing  (increasing) 
absolute risk aversion. Non-increasing absolute risk aversion ensures that tax evasion rises with a 
greater measure of outside control α and non-decreasing absolute risk aversion guarantees that 
tax evasion declines with the indicator of profit dependency θ. A higher tax rate t will raise tax 
evasion  if  managers  exhibit  non-decreasing  absolute  risk  aversion  and  the  penalty  does  not 
depend on the tax rate (δ = 0). 
Proof: Results obtain from equation (3) for T* = B and β = 0. 
 
4.5 Summary 
The  comparative  static  effects  derived  above  are  summarised  in  Tables  1  and  2,  assuming 
constant absolute risk aversion. For Case 2, unambiguous findings are reported only if the impact 
on B* and T* does not depend on the functional form for the costs of excessive declarations (i.e. 
β and γ). Table 1 excludes Case 4, as it presumes that book profits B cannot vary independently.  
Table 1: Impact of an increase in exogenous variables on optimal book profit declaration B* 
  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3 
exogenous variable  B* > Π = T  B* ≥ T* > Π  B*, Π > T* 
θ (indicator of profit dependency)  ?  ?  ? 
α (measure of outside control)  ?  ?  ? 
I (fixed salary)  < 0  ≤ 0  < 0 
β (marginal costs of divergent declarations)  < 0  ?  ? 
t (tax rate)  > 0  ?  ? 
   15 
Table 1 shows that an increase in the fixed salary I never raises optimal book profit statements 
B*. Since this is also true for a shift in the composition of income, that is a rise in I and a fall in 
the indicator of profit dependency θ, the results suggest that in countries or companies in which 
managers are primarily compensated with a fixed salary the difference between publicly declared 
book profits B* and true profits Π is less than in settings in which the CEO's compensation is 
more strongly dependent on profit-related, variable elements.  
Table  2  sums  up  the  impact  of  variations  in  exogenous  variables  on  the  extent  of  false  tax 
declarations, that is, in Case 2, on the positive and in Cases 3 and 4, on the negative difference 
between tax and true profits T* and Π. Case 1 is excluded as it assumes truthful tax declarations.  
Table 2:    
Impact of an increase in exogenous variables on optimal extent of false tax declaration T* - Π 
  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4 
exogenous variable  B* ≥ T* > Π  B*, Π > T*  Π > T* = B 
θ (indicator of profit dependency)  ?  < 0  < 0 
α (measure of outside control)  ?  > 0  > 0 
I (fixed salary)  ?  0  0 
β (marginal costs of divergent declarations)  > 0 for T < B  ?  n. a. 
t (tax rate)  ?  > 0 if δ = 0  > 0 if δ = 0  
        n. a. - comparative static result is not available as T* = B implies β = 0. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 clarify that the relationship between book-tax differences and (a) the determinants 
of the manager's remuneration, (b) the costs of false profit declarations, and (c) the tax rate is 
basically uncertain. This ambiguity is due to the fact that optimal tax and book profit statements 
B* and T* both adjust and often do not represent substitutes but tend to move in the same 
direction.  
 
5. Endogenising the Remuneration Contract 
The above analysis presumed the remuneration scheme to be given. However, if the manager 
responds  to  changes  in  his  income  by  adjustments  in  profit  declarations,  the  agents  who 
determine the remuneration contract may use this information to maximise their own payoffs. 
Assume, therefore, that the components of the manager's gross income are under the control of 
the firm's owner, while the tax rate t and the marginal costs β of divergent profit declarations can 
be set by the government. The questions then arise whether (1) there is an optimal remuneration 
system  from  the  owner's  or  the  government's  perspective  and  (2)  the  comparative  static 
predictions continue to hold.    16 
To answer these questions, subsequently either the variables controlled by the owner of the firm 
or the government are endogenised. The timing is as follows: First, the owner (government) 
chooses fixed income I, the indicator of profit dependency θ, and the measure of outside control 
α (the tax rate t and the marginal costs β of excessive book profit declarations), taking into 
account that the manager, in a second step, selects profit declarations in order to maximise his 
expected utility. Accordingly, the owner or the government acts as Stackelberg leader. Their 
choices  and  the  manager's  actions  constitute  a  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  assumed  to  be 
unique and well defined. Finally, it is presumed that the order of profit declarations, as defined 
by Cases 1 to 4, remains unaffected. 
 
5.1 Implications for Optimal Remuneration Contract 
Answering the first of the above questions requires a specification of the objective of the firm's 
owner and the government. Focussing on the owner's payoff  , assume that   is a function of 
book and tax profits B and T, as well as the components I, α, and θ of the manager's income y. If 
the owner's payoff declines with the manager's remuneration,  I,  θ < 0 and  α(Π – B) < 0 will 
apply, where subscripts denote partial derivatives. In addition, higher tax payments make the 
owner worse off, implying  T < 0 for a given tax rate t. Finally, it is likely that the payoff   
initially increases with book profits B, for example, because the value of shares rises, but that   
eventually declines with B. We will, therefore, have   =  (B*(z), T*(z), z), for z = I, α, θ, if the 
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Let the maximisation problem be well behaved, implying  BB,  TT, and  zz < 0 inter alia, so 
that  an  interior  solution  is  attained,  and  note  that  the  magnitudes  of   B  and   T  cannot  be 
compared,  unless     is  specified  in  more  detail.  An  interpretation  of  (4),  therefore,  requires 
knowledge about the signs of dB*/dz and of dT*/dz. 
From Tables 1 and 2, dB*/dI < 0 and dT*/dI = 0 can be established for Cases 1 and 3. Therefore, 
 T,  I < 0 imply that  B < 0 warrants equation (4). For given values of θ and α, the optimal 
salary I guarantees that the owner's payoff declines with a further rise in book profit declarations. 
The intuition for  B < 0 at Γ(I) = 0 in Cases 1 and 3 is that the optimal salary I balances the 
owner's costs due to higher payments to the manager ( I < 0) with gains resulting from lower 
book profits B*, which arise since B* declines with the salary I.    17 
A  complete  specification  of  the  manager's  optimal  remuneration  contract,  that  is  an  optimal 
choice of z = I, α, θ, is feasible in Case 4 in which the manager only selects the amount of taxes 
evaded Π – T* optimally. Since B = T*, dB/dI = dT*/dI = 0, dB/dα = dT*/dα < 0, dB/dθ = 
dT*/dθ > 0,  I,  θ < 0, and  α < 0 for Π > B, we have  I < 0 from equation (4). In addition, an 
interior solution to the maximisation problem with respect to θ (Γ(θ) = 0), given  T < 0, requires 
 B > 0. For  B > 0, also Γ(α) = 0 is feasible. Given tax evasion and book and tax profits which 
coincide (Π > B = T*), the manager thus receives the lowest fixed salary I feasible ( I < 0), 
while his profit-related income is based both on true profits Π and on book profit declarations B. 
The intuition is as follows: In Case 4, the fixed salary I does not influence profit declarations. 
However, the salary I reduces the owner's payoff   directly. The other two determinants of the 
manager's remuneration, the indicator of profit dependency θ and the measure of outside control 
α, both have an indirect impact on the owner's payoff and, hence, also belong to an optimal 
remuneration scheme.  
When  interpreting  the  specification  of  the  manager's  optimal  remuneration  scheme  in  this 
manner, a number of caveats should be kept in mind: Firstly, a participation constraint may limit 
the owner's scope to adjust the fixed salary I downwards. Secondly, since profit declarations 
depend on θ and α, the optimal choice of θ and α may yield profit declarations which are no 
longer  compatible  with  a  particular  Case,  such  as  Case  4.  Thirdly,  the  components  of  the 
manager's remuneration contract have been limited by the definition of income as y = I + θ (T). 
Such  a  specification  may  not  adequately  capture  the  effects  of  bonuses  or  more  elaborate 
compensation schemes. Finally, by assuming a fixed level of true profits Π, an important element 
of  the  owner's  payoff  has  not  been  endogenised  (see  e.g.  Goldman  and  Slezak  (2006)  and 
Crocker and Slemrod (2007) who focus on this aspect).  
 
5.2 Implications For Government Policies 
Knowing a manager's response to variations in exogenous parameters may not only stimulate a 
reaction by the firm's owner but also by the government. Suppose, therefore, that the government 
optimally determines the variables under its control, namely the tax rate t and the marginal costs 
β of making divergent profit declarations, taking as given the components of the remuneration 
contract I, α, and θ, and the manager's reactions, as captured by B*(β, t) and T*(β, t). Assume, 
further, that the government needs tax revenues τ > 0. Subject to this constraint (τ = Tt), the 
government  minimises  the  sum  of  the  loss  arising  from  divergent  book  and  tax  profit 
declarations  B  –  T  and  the  costs  C  of  reducing  this  divergence.  The  government's  costs  C 
increase in the manager's costs β of divergent declarations, implying C = C(β), C(0) = 0 < C', C''.   18 
To simplify the exposition, the government's loss from divergent declarations is assumed to be a 
quadratic function of (B - T). Accordingly, the government minimises 
[ ] t - l + b + - = b b b t * T ) ( C 2 *) T * B ( : ) t , ), t , ( * T ), t , ( * B ( G ,      (5) 
where λ represents the Lagrange-multiplier. The optimisation yields Gt = Gβ = Gλ = 0.  
In Case 4, T* = B holds by assumption. Given sufficient tax revenues, the government either sets 
β to the minimal value which just satisfies Π > B = T* or reduces β so that the restrictions of 
Case 4 no longer apply. Therefore, the comparative static features of Case 4 are not affected by a 
potential response of the government. Since, moreover, the signs of dT*/dβ, dB*/dβ, dT*/dt, and 
dB*/dt  are  at  least  partially  indeterminate  in  Cases  2  and  3,  the  government  cannot 
systematically adjust the tax rate t and the costs β of divergent declarations to improve its payoff 
in these situations.  
In Case 1 the manager's response to changes in the indicator of profit dependency θ and the 
measure  of  outside  control  α  are  uncertain  (see  Table  1).  Accordingly,  the  government's 
optimisation problem is only well-defined in Case 1 with respect to the salary I. Since T is fixed 
(Π = T), dT/dt = 0 holds by assumption and the tax rate immediately results from the revenue 
constraint. As a consequence, the government minimises G exclusively with respect to the costs 
β of divergent declarations. It can then be shown (see Appendix 4) that book profits, taking into 
account that the government adjusts β in response to the manager's behaviour, will decline with 
the fixed salary I if and only if the third derivative of the utility function is positive (u'''(y) > 0).  
We can conclude: Even if the government knows that a manager responds to variations in the 
composition  of  his  remuneration,  the  model  does  not  contain  sufficient  structure  to  yield 
predictions which would let the government condition the tax rate t and the marginal costs β of 
divergent profit declarations on the manager's behaviour. This is the case because, firstly, the 
relationship between optimal book and tax profit declarations B* and T* and the components of 
the remuneration contract is often not well-defined. Secondly, even if the link is predictable (as 
in the case of the fixed salary I), the government would have to precisely know the manager's 
utility function to react optimally.  
 
5.3 Comparative Statics and Correlations 
The upshot of the previous two sub-sections is that neither the firm's owner nor the government 
can  systematically  predict  how  a  manager  will  react  to  changes  in  the  components  of  his 
remuneration contract. One may therefore conclude that if the owner and the government cannot 
foresee the consequences of adjustments, for example, in the fixed income I or the tax rate t, they   19 
cannot  use  the  insight  of  the  model  to  further  their  own  purposes.  As  a  consequence,  the 
comparative static effects summarised in Tables 1 and 2 are unlikely to be affected by taking into 
account that the indicator of profit dependency θ, the measure of outside control α, and the 
manager's fixed salary I or the tax rate t and the marginal costs β of excessive book profits are 
effectively endogenous. This conclusion would obviously be strengthened by assuming more 
sophisticated objectives of the firm's owner and particularly of the government which could, for 
example, include the revenues resulting from the detection of evasion activities.  
However,  it  may  also  be  contended  that  particularly  the  firm's  owner  and  also  perhaps  the 
government  will  be  well  informed  of  the  manager's  behaviour,  for  example,  because  the 
functional relationships (for β(·) and γ(·)) and risk attitudes are known. The question then arises 
whether the comparative static relationships will continue to hold if this knowledge is exploited 
by  the  owner  and  the  government.  Should  the  interactions  between  the  various  variables 
predicted on the basis of comparative statics exercises no longer apply, great care will have to be 
exercised when interpreting evidence in the light of the theoretical analysis. 
Given that book and tax profit declarations B and T and the components of the remuneration 
contract I, α, θ or the variables β and t under the government's influence are endogenous, the 
correlation between any two variables may be determined as follows: Suppose, the government 
is passive. Then, z = I, α, θ are chosen optimally by the owner. A variation either in the tax rate t 
or  the  marginal  costs  β  of  excessive  book  profit  declarations  relative  to  tax  profits  can  be 
employed to compute the correlation between B* and z*. If the direction of this correlation, 
given by dB*/dz* = (dB*/dx)/(dz*/dx), for x = t, β, is the same as the comparative static result 
dB*/dz derived in Section 4, the nature of the link between book profits and the z variable will 
not be altered by the endogenisation of z.  
To clarify the approach and to derive the scope for results, the subsequent analysis focuses on 
Case 1, in which tax profit declarations T are truthful and optimal book profits exceed their true 
level (B* > T = Π). In addition, x = t, β are exogenous. Therefore, the subgame-perfect Nash-
equilibrium with the firm's owner as a Stackelberg leader is defined by VB(B*, z, x) = 0 and 
Γ(B*(z, x), T*(z, x), z, x) = 0 (cf. equations (2) and (4)), for z = I, α, θ (cf. Section 5.1)). Total 
differentiation  of  the  two  equations  yields  dB*/dx = (ΓxVBz - VBxΓz)/D  and 
dz*/dx = (ΓBVBx - VBBΓx)/D, where the determinant D and the derivatives dB*/dx and dz*/dx 
are assumed to be non-zero. Note that dB*/dx now describes the adjustment in B* in the Nash-
equilibrium defined by equations (2) and (4) and, hence, differs from the expressions derived in 
Section 4 and used in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. To clarify this difference, let B*z := - VBz/VBB and   20 
B*x := - VBx/VBB denote the (partial) changes in optimal book profits B*, as derived in Section 
4 on the basis of equation (2), while z*x = -Γx/Γz and z*B = -ΓB/Γz represent the optimal 
(partial)  variations  in  the  z  variables  (cf.  equation  (4)).  Dividing  all  expressions  of 
(dB*/dx)/(dz*/dx) by VBBΓx, we obtain: 
x * z x * B B * z





=           (6) 
In Case 1, and given the specification of the government's objective G (cf. equation (5)), the tax 
rate t is determined by the budget constraint, while the marginal costs β of excessive book profits 
can  be  chosen  optimally  by  the  government.  However,  from  the  owner's  and  the  manager's 
perspective the parameter β is exogenous. It can be shown (see Appendix 5) that z*BB*β = z*β. 
Using this relationship and assuming x = β, equation (6) can be rewritten: 
b + b = b * B * z z * B * z
* dz
* dB
2           (7) 
Optimal book profits B* decrease with the marginal costs β of divergent book-tax declarations 
(see Proposition 1), implying B*β < 0. The sign of z*B is theoretically ambiguous. In addition, 
B*z can be negative (for z = I, as well as for z = α and a measure of relative risk aversion v = 
y/(θ (B))) or positive (for z = θ and v < y/(θ (B))). We, hence, distinguish four cases, resulting 
from z*β and B*z each being either negative or positive. For B*z z*β < 0 the right-hand side of 
(7) is negative and dB*/dz* and B*z have the same sign. In this case, the correlation between B* 
and z* has the same direction as the change in book profits B* owing to a rise in an exogenous 
component z of the remuneration contract. The endogenisation of the contract and the knowledge 
about the impact of z = I, α, θ on B* would not affect the findings derived in Section 4. Suppose, 
next, that B*z < 0 and z*β < 0 apply. The first sign restriction holds for z = I. The second 
inequality requires an additional restriction on the curvature of  . It can then, moreover, be 
shown that the right-hand side of (7) is negative (see Appendix 5). In such a setting, dB*/dz* and 
B*z have opposite signs.
12 
More generally, whether the correlation and the comparative static impact are qualitatively the 
same depends, inter alia, on the variable which is employed to generate variations in the two 
endogenous variables, on the specification of the owner's objective  , and on the case examined. 
The intuition for the ambiguous sign of the correlation between the two variables can best be 
                                                 
12 The limiting cases of z*β = 0, and B*z = 0 and the combination B*z > 0, z*β > 0 are not looked at, since the 
inequalities considered already suffice to demonstrate that the sign of (dB*/dz*)/B*z is not well determined    21 
grasped by inspection of equation (7). A change in a variable which is truly exogenous from the 
manager's and the owner's point of view, also has a direct effect on the respective payoffs. These 
direct effects are basically of uncertain sign and (relative) magnitude. Therefore, they can not 
only affect the strength of a relationship between two variables but also alter the direction of the 
correlation. Only if the change in the exogenous variable β had no impact on the manager's 
behaviour (B*β = 0), would the correlation between B* and z* (= I*) certainly be of the same 
direction as suggested by the comparative static exercise. 
On an even wider scale, it has to be taken into account that the above analysis has looked at the 
simplest setting in which the manager only chooses book profit declarations B optimally because 
tax profits T coincide with true profits (T = Π). In Cases 2 and 3 the manager can adjust his 
behaviour at two margins. The analysis of Section 4 has shown that in such a setting the impact 
of changes in exogenous variables on optimal book profit and tax profit declarations B* and T* 
will become less predictable. This will be all the more true if the determinants of the manager's 
remuneration  contract  or  the  variables  under  the  government's  control  are  endogenous.  In 
addition, if these variables become endogenous, varying a truly exogenous parameter can induce 
adjustments  which  move  the  manager  from  one  case  to  the  other.  Accordingly,  the  main 
consequences from the findings obtained in Section 5 result for empirical work:  In order to 
assess  the  validity  of  the  model  laid  out  above,  appropriate  care  has  to  be  taken  that  truly 
exogenous  changes  in  the  determinants  of  the  manager's  utility  are  examined,  or  that  the 
endogeneity of the determinants of the manager's payoff is appropriately catered for. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analyses a risk-averse manager's joint decision regarding tax declarations and book 
profit statements. Ceteris paribus, tax payments reduce the manager's payoff, while book profits 
increase it. Tax evasion will be penalised if detected, and excessive book profit declarations can 
also be costly. In this framework, book profit statements never fall short of true profits and tax 
profit declarations simultaneously. Moreover, taxes may be overpaid if such behaviour reduces 
the costs of excessive book profit statements. Tax evasion can also occur.  
Four main conclusions derive from the investigation: Firstly, there is a correlation between the 
tax and book profit declarations which is optimal from a manager's point of view. The theoretical 
nature of this relationship, that is whether book profit and tax profit declarations are substitutes 
or complements, depends strongly on the specification of the manager's remuneration contract. 
Secondly, any empirical investigation of corporate tax compliance and of earnings management 
has to take into account that variations in exogenous variables likely to affect one indicator of   22 
management behaviour tend to influence the other as well. Thirdly, interpreting the manager's 
behaviour within a principal-agent setting, in which either the firm's owner or the government 
represents the principal, does not provide substantive information regarding the specification of 
an 'optimal' contract. In addition, variables which are exogenous from the manager's perspective 
become  endogenous  in  a  principal-agent-setting.  This  can  alter  the  empirically  observable 
correlation between two variables. Fourthly, tax overpayments need not only arise by mistake, 
but can be an integral component of rational behaviour.   23 
Appendix 
1. Proof of Proposition 1 (Case 1, B* > Π = T) 
The optimal choice of book profit declarations B* is determined by VB = 0 (cf. equation (2)). 
Since VBB = θ2(1 - α)2u''(y) < 0 for T ≥ Π, and dB*/dx = - VBx/VBB for x = θ, α, β, Π, I, t, the 
comparative static effects are determined by the signs of VBβ = - 1 and 
VBθ = (1 - α)[u'(y) + θu''(y)∆(B)] =  [ ] ) y / ) B ( )( y ( 1 ) y ( ' u ) 1 ( D q v - a - ,     (A.1.1) 
VBα = - θ[u'(y) - θ(1 - α)u''(y)(Π – B*)] =  ( ) [ ] y / ))) t 1 ( ( I ( 1 ) y ( 1 ) y ( ' u - P q + - v - q - ,  (A.1.2) 
VBt = - θ2(1 - α)u''(y)T = - θTVBI > 0,      (A.1.3) 
for  ) y ( v := - yu''(y)/u'(y) > 0 as the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion and ∆(B) :=  
(α – t)Π + (1 - α)B* > 0 for Π = T.  
 
2. Proof of Proposition 2 (Case 2, B* ≥ T* > Π) 
The combination of (2') and (3') yields β(1 – α – t)/t – γ'(B* – Π) = 0. Thus, dB*/dI = dB*/dθ = 
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Differentiation of (3') for y  =  I + θ(αΠ + (1 - α)B* - T*t) = I + θ∆(B, T) gives rise to 
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as B* does not change with I and θ. Taking into account that optimal book profits B* depend on 
α, γ', β, and t according to (A.2.1) and (A.2.2), using the results from Appendix 1 gives rise to:  
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3. Proof of Proposition 3 (Case 3, B* > Π > T*) 
The subsequent calculations are analogous to those in Appendix 2 for γ(B – Π) = γ' = γ'' = 0.  
0 ) c y ( ' ' u ) p 1 ( ) e y ( ' ' pu 2 ) 1 ( 2
BB V <  

 
 - + a - q =         (A.3.1) 
0 2 ) Ft t )( c y ( ' ' u ) p 1 ( 2 t ) e y ( ' ' pu 2
TT V <  

 




 d - - + a - q - = ) Ft t )( c y ( ' ' u ) p 1 ( t ) e y ( ' ' pu ) 1 ( 2
TB V       (A.3.3) 
The determinant D = VBBVTT - (VBT)2 =  2 ) Ft )( c y ( ' ' u ) p 1 )( e y ( ' ' pu 2 ) 1 ( 4 d - a - q  is positive 
(D > 0). Note that by combining (A.3.3) with the first-order condition (3) and using the Arrow-
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If absolute risk aversion does not decrease too strongly with income, VTB > 0 will hold. 
Changes in the first-order condition (3) for the optimal choice of tax profit declarations T*, given 
a positive amount of tax evasion (T* < Π), are given by VTβ = 1 and by: 
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Note that if VTB ≥ 0, VTt will be negative for δ = 0. The changes in the first-order condition (2) 
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The term in square brackets in the second line of (A.3.16) and of (A.3.17) below is positive, as 
inspection of the first-order condition (3) reveals. Accordingly, (A.3.16) is negative for δ = 0. 
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Equations  (A.3.12)  to  (A.3.17)  and  D  >  0  establish  Proposition  3.  As  no  unambiguous 
predictions can be obtained, the derivations of dB*/dθ and dB*/dα are omitted. 
 
4. Optimal Choice of β by Government (Case 1) 
For dT/dt = 0 and t = τ/T, G is given by G(β). Taking into account dT*/dβ = 0, we have: 
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Let equation (A.4.1) define the optimal costs β* of divergent book and tax profit declarations. 
Since Gββ = 2(dB*/dβ)2 > 0 for d2B*/dβ2 = 0, dB*/dI < 0, and dB*/dβ = 1/(θ2(1 – α)2u''(y)) < 0 
for y := I + θ(αΠ + (1 – α)B* – Tt) (see equation (1') and Appendix 1), the impact of a rise in the 
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Denoting  by  B
~
  optimal  book  profit  declarations  in  the  presence  of  a  government  response, 
making use of (A.4.2) and dB*/dβ = B*β, the change in B
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Since B* - T > 0, dB
~
/dI has the same sign as dB*/dI and is, therefore, negative, for u'''(y) > 0.  
 
5. Correlation: Changes in the Maximised Payoff Γ of the Firm's Owner 
The derivatives of Γ (cf. equation (4)) with respect to B, β, and z are given by: 
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d
:   (A.5.3) 
The  second-order  condition  Γz  <  0  for  a  maximum  of  Γ  is  assumed  to  hold.  Since     and, 
therefore, also  B and  z are not explicit functions of β,  Bβ =  zβ = 0 hold. In addition,  
VBβ = - 1 implies B*zβ = 0. These considerations establish the relationship between (A5.2) and 
(A.5.3), as captured by the last equality sign in (A.5.3). For z = I, B*zB = 0 applies because B*I 
= -1/(θ(1 – α)) < 0. Given  BB < 0 and  zB ≥ 0 as additional assumption, ΓB > 0 and ΓβB*β < 
0 result. As a consequence, z*β < 0 holds. In addition, we have BII = 0,  II < 0, and  IB ≥ 0 for 
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